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I. INTRODUCTION
Pressure to divest is sweeping the country.1 Some commentators
maintain that divestment is futile, puts portfolios at risk, and comes
close to stealing from beneficiaries of pensions and private trusts.2 Re-
cent legal3 and financial4 analysis indicates that trustees may be able
to divest without breaching any fiduciary duties.
The purpose of this Article is to present the arguments in favor of
divestment. Among other things I have not limited myself to com-
menting on the current state of the law, nor have I confined myself to
traditional trust principles.5 In writing this "brief," I am going to al-
low myself two luxuries: I intend to make my clients' case, not my
opponents'; and I shall make incredible arguments as well as credible
ones, for the argument that might not pursuade me or you might per-
suade the judge. I, of course, have no client in this matter. I have just
given myself the hypothetical job of writing a brief for divestment,
because it seemed like a useful thing to do.6
1. See, e.g., The Christian Sci. Monitor, June 7, 1985, at 8. Of course, not all people
are in favor of divestment. See Langbein, Social Investing of Pension Funds and
University Endowments: Unprincipled Futile, and Illegal, in DISINVESTMENT 1
(1985).
2. See generally Langbein, supra note 1.
3. See S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LiTWAK & J. KARPEN, PENSION FUNDS AND ETHI-
CAL INVESTMENT 128-42 (1980); T. Troyer & R. Boisture, Divestment of South
African Investments: A Legal Analysis for Foundations, Other Charitable Insti-
tutions and Pension Funds (Apr. 15, 1985) (unpublished manuscript). See also
Troyer, Slocombe & Boisture, Divestment of South Africa Investments: The
Legal Implications for Foundations, Other Charitable Institutions and Pension
Funds, 74 GEO. L. J. - (1986) (forthcoming).
4. See S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 93-127;
Rudd, Divestment of South African Equities: How Risky?, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT.
5-10 (Spring 1979); Wagner, Emkin & Dixon, South African Divestment: The In-
vestment Issues, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 14. See also F. Cheru, The
Financial Implications of Divestment: A Review of the Evidence (June 1984) (un-
published manuscript) (a brief study of the question).
5. Cf T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 31 (suggesting that Scott has gone
beyond traditional social investing doctrine).
6. I practiced as a trust and estates and charitable corporations specialist for ten
years, and have now taught and written in the trusts and estates area almost as
long. I am well acquainted with fiduciary duty, know more about investment
theory than a lot of people, and a little more about South Africa than a lot of
people. I am well aware of the enormous complexity of the South African situa-
tion and believe that most Americans cannot even begin to understand the
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II. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Divestment Defined
Divestment is the sale by investors of the securities of businesses
with South African contacts. 7 There exists a broad spectrum of possi-
ble divestment plans.S These range from (1) immediate sale of all
holdings that have anything to do with South Africa, to (2) the slow
sale of the securities of Standard and Poor's 500 corporations9 that
have a business presence in South Africa, to (3) active shareholdingO
of corporations that do business in South Africa, with periodic culling
of the shares of corporations that do not actively pursue social justice
in that country."1
All divestment plans must deal with at least two questions: what
gets sold, and when it gets sold. As to what gets sold, this Article ad-
heres to the second definition above: the sale of all stock of any Stan-
dard and Poor's 500 company with a business presence in South
Africa.12 It is this type of company that has generated the most con-
troversy.13 As to when the sale takes place, this Article assumes or-
derly sales over a period of time long enough not to depress the
market. Instant divestment of large stock portfolios is generally con-
Afrikaner mentality unless they have had some contact with Afrikaners. I ask
the reader's indulgence-please do not think that you know what I believe on
these issues or that I have missed some crucial point. This Article is not a letter
to my employers, the Regents of the University of California, nor is it an attempt
to influence their conduct. The Regents and I have an arrangement: they leave
me alone and I leave them alone. That arrangement has worked quite well for all
concerned.
7. J. SIMON, C. PowERs & J. GUNNERMANN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR 11 (1972). As
stated in the text, divestment is the sale by investors of the securities of busi-
nesses with South African contacts. Disinvestment is corporations ceasing to do
business in South Africa.
8. Id at 52.
9. Standard and Poor's is a financial rating service. One of its many services is to
publish a list of the so-called Standard and Poor's 500 corporations. Standard and
Poor's 500 corporations are companies from various sectors of the economy cho-
sen for their ability, as a whole, to emulate the movement of the market. L.
GITMAN & M. JOEHNK, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTING 82, 84 (1981). For our
purposes, the S & P 500 is a convenient symbol of the larger companies with
publicly traded securities, that operate in the public view.
10. See, e.g., Bok, Statement of Derek Bok on Investment Policy, in DISINVESTMENT 99
(1985).
11. See J. SIMON, C. POwERs & J. GUNNERMANN, supra note 7, at 52.
12. The statement in the text is a useful simplification. A divesting investor should
apply her definition of divestment to all stocks in her portfolio.
13. We must remember that divestment is really not about selling the stock of com-
panies that sell police hardware to the South African government. It is not even
about selling the shares of companies that mine gold in South Africa. It is about
selling the shares of major American corporations that do some business in South
Africa.
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sidered imprudent and therefore is not addressed in this Article.14
B. Why Divestment?
I assume that people seek to divest to get justice in South Africa,
either through evolution or revolution in that society. Some assume
that divestment will lead to corporate disengagement,15 which will
yield change.16 Others see divestment as the first step to denying
South Africa access to capital and/or technology, which again will pre-
sumably lead to change.' 7 Still others treat the question as one of
morality.18
How might divestment make South Africa a more just society?
Sales of the shares of corporations doing business in South Africa may
be meaningless if the shares are simply bought by other investors.19
Divestment, however, can be an act of communication to others con-
sidering divestment: to corporate management, to American and
South African politicians, and to the people of both countries. 20 The
various messages sent can hopefully change the conduct of manage-
ment, politicians, and citizens. Stock sales can possibly yield a change
in the actions of management through a temporary drop in stock
prices, 21 or through a deterioration in public image that interferes
with doing business. 2 2 The problem with forcing the prices of shares
down through sales is that it is bad for the seller-you have to get into
the cage with the lion to hit it over the head with the two-by-four. At
this writing, the message is reaching American politicians. To this ex-
tent the divestment movement is not futile.23
14. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1985, § 3, at 10, col. 1, which notes that Wall Street
professionals assume any divestment will take place over an extended period of
time.
15. To avoid confusion, I am using the term "disengagement" instead of the term
"disinvestment" to describe a company leaving South Africa.
16. See D. MYERS, U.S. BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 127-28 (1980).
17. South Africa Divestment: Hearings and Markups on H. Con. Res. 216 and H. Res.
372 Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Affairs and Health of the House Comm. on the
Dist of Columbia, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 373 (1984) (reprint of the Africa Fund,
South Africa: Questions and Answers on Divestment #4-81) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings].
18. See infra notes 112-42 and accompanying text.
19. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 12.
20. See D. HAUCK, M. VOORHES & G. GOLDBERG, Two DECADES OF DEBATE: THE
CONTROVERSY OVER U.S. COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 147 (1983); D. MYERS,
supra note 16, at 127.
21. The drop in price discussed in the text would come from the mass sales of stock
by individuals and/or institutional holders. One imagines the drop would be tem-
porary, but it is obvious that if institutions became generally disenchanted with a
corporation's South Africa policy to the point of dumping the stock then that
corporation's South Africa policy would change very quickly.
22. See J. SIMON, C. POWERS & J. GUNNERMANN, supra note 7, at 53.
23. See L.A. Times, July 12, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
[Vol. 65:209
SOUTH AFRICAN DIVESTMENT
Divestment can be seen as the first step in an attempt to deny
South Africa access to American capital, the goals being, perhaps, forc-
ing those who govern South Africa to come to their senses, and to
change their policy, or to make conditions so bad as to hasten a revolu-
tion.24 Obviously, the United States is not the only source of capital,
but it is a very important one.25
Similarly, divestment can be seen as the first step in an attempt to
deny South Africa access to American technology.26 Again, the
United States is not the only source of technology. But, to the extent
that any of its technology is unique or preferable, and to the extent
that divestment can cause people to stop doing business in South Af-
rica, then there is a purpose to divestment.27
Divestment is just one issue on the general agenda of social invest-
ing.28 This Article presents only one side of that one issue.2 9 Social
investing is a funny business. I believe that a small but meaningful
number of trusts will be amended or drafted to forbid social investing
because of the apparent success of the divestment movement. It must
be remembered, too, that reforms often bring results opposite from
the ones intended.30 There are at least two such risks here. The first
is that the noble desire to reform apartheid in South Africa via the
investment policies of American fiduciaries may lead to unexpected
and unfortunate results.31 For instance, divestment may harm trust
portfolios while accomplishing no change in South Africa.3 2 A second,
and lesser, reform risk is that more trusts may forbid social investing
as people press for it.s3
Certain threshold arguments have been advanced against divest-
24. See D. HAUCK, M. VOORHEs & G. GOLDBERG, supra note 20, at 127-28.
25. S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. LARPEN, supra note 3, at 17; A. NEWMAN
& C. BOWERs, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA 111 (1984).
26. B. BALDWIN & T. BROWN, ECONOMIC ACTION AGAINST APARTHEID: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE DIVESTMENT CAMPAIGN & FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADITIONAL IN-
VESTORS 7-8 (1985); House Hearings, supra note 17, at 373.
27. See House Hearings, supra note 17, at 373.
28. See generally E. COLTMAN & S. METZENBAUM, INVESTING IN OURSELVES: STRATE-
GIES FOR MASSACHUSETTS (1979); H. GRAY, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE INVESTMENT
AND CONTROL OF PENSION FUNDS (1983); B. LONGSTRETH & H. ROSENBLOOM,
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1973); J.
SIMON, C. POWERS & J. GUNNERMANN, supra note 7; Langbein & Posner, Social
Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72 (1980); Moeller, Socially
Committed Investments, 123 TR. & EST. 56 (1984).
29. For the other side of the issue see Langbein, supra note 1.
30. See UNIV. OF CAL., OFFICE OF THE TREASURER, 1 TREASURER'S REPORT ON SOUTH
AFRICA INVESTMENTS 21 (1985) (limited circulation report) [hereinafter cited as
U. CAL. REP.].
31. See The Not-Quite Revolution, ECONOMIST, July 27, 1985, at 11.
32. F. Cheru, supra note 4, at 8.
33. See, e.g., Dobris, A Brieffor the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1215 (1984).
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ment.34 Most important, divestment opponents contend that the Sulli-
van Principles35 are effecting meaningful social change.36 In response
to this argument, it can be said that continued United States presence
in South Africa, even with full corporate compliance with the Sullivan
Principles, can never be a meaningful force for social change.3 7 Not
that many black people work for United States companies, 38 and not
many more are likely to be hired, since the typical American com-
pany's presence in the country is capital intensive, not labor inten-
sive. 39 Furthermore, the blacks who do work for United States
companies are in low level jobs, for the most part, with little chance
for advancement due to inadequate education and training.40
The real benefit of investment in South Africa, it can be said, ac-
crues to the white minority, and a few nonwhites, and not to the black
majority.41 The economy is in reality a dual economy, with the whites
and some nonwhites obtaining the benefit of United States invest-
ment, not the black majority.42 This means two things: such invest-
ment is morally wrong because it supports an undesirable oligarchy,
and such investment is wrongly labeled as being good for blacks.
Next, it is argued that United States disinvestment from South Af-
rica would have no effect on social reform in that country.43 Even if
34. See generally Langbein, supra note 1 (a negative discussion of all social
investing).
35. The Sullivan Principles is a voluntary code of corporate behavior that a number
of U.S. companies operating in South Africa have ratified. One of the goals of the
Principles is to gradually integrate the workplace and promote social harmony.
For instance, the Principles call for integration of bathrooms and eating areas.
For the text of the current Principles see Schotland, Divergent Investing of Pen-
sion Funds and University Endowments: Key Points About Pragmatics, and Two
Current Case Studies, in DIVESTMENT 31 & 71-73 (1985).
36. See id. at 63-64. See also Murray, U.S. Investment in South Africa - the $2.5 bil-
lion question, FORTUNE, Oct. 1, 1984, at 151-60 (advertisement).
37. See D. HAUCK, M. VOORHES & G. GOLDBERG, supra note 20, at 94, 98. Rev. Sulli-
van has called for U.S. companies to withdraw if apartheid has not ended by 1987.
This seems to indicate that the promulgator of the Principles himself has some
doubts about the efficacy of the Principles. See Sullivan Calls for Economic
Sanctions if Apartheid Not Ended in Two Years, 3(2) S. AFR. REV. SERVICE REP.
33 (June 1985). The Sullivan Principles now call for signatories to lobby against
apartheid. See Schotland, supra note 35, at 73. This may be against South Afri-
can law. See The Africa Fund, South Africa Fact Sheet, 1 S. AFR. PERSP. 3 (Mar.
1984) [hereinafter cited as Fact Sheet].
38. About 65,000 people of all colors work for American corporations that have
signed the Sullivan Principles. See Schotland, supra note 35, at 61. Of those,
40,000, or about 1.5 percent of the total workforce, are nonwhites.
39. See A. NEWMAN & C. BOWERS, supra note 25, at 197.
40. See D. MYERS, supra note 16, at 20 & 24-25.
41. See Fact Sheet, supra note 37, at 2.
42. See S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 13.
43. See D. MYERS, supra note 16, at 78.
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this is true, which it probably is not,4 4 we might as well do the moral
thing at that point and leave.45
C. Basic Trust Law
To deal adequately with the legal issues that divestment presents,
one must first have an understanding of basic principles of trust law.
This includes knowledge of the various fiduciary standards and duties
under which a typical trustee, pension trustee, or charitable director
must operate.
There are three types of trusts that we need to consider: those that
are silent on the question of divestment; those that allow divestment;
and those that forbid divestment.46 At this writing, the vast bulk of
the trusts in existence are surely silent on the question.47
In dealing with a silent trust there are three logical possibilities,
assuming the law is clear on the question: (1) the body of law gov-
erning that trust requires divestment, a most unlikely possibility;48 (2)
the body of law governing that trust forbids divestment;49 or (3) the
body of law governing that trust allows divestment. When all is said
and done this Article is a brief for the third position.
Every trustee is a fiduciary. Simply stated, a fiduciary relationship
exists as to property when its legal owner has duties to another re-
garding that property.50 Those duties to the beneficiary transcend
mere private ownership by the fiduciary.51 Thus, during the existence
of the fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary must always act in the best
interests of the beneficiary.52 This dedication to the beneficiary, the
duty of loyalty, seems to stand in the way of divestment.53 That is, the
44. See ROCKEFELLER FOUND., STUDY COMMISSION ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH-
ERN AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA TIME RUNNING OUT xxi (1981).
45. It is interesting to note that apartheid has only been in place in South Africa since
1948. See D. MYERS, supra note 16, at 5-9; 1 U. CAL. REP., supra note 30, at 8.
While the social problems of South Africa are much older, the immediate prob-
lem is relatively new, and therefore perhaps more solvable than might be
imagined.
46. Cf. Dobris, Ethical Problems for Lawyers Upon Trust Terminations: Conflicts of
Interest, 38 U. MIAu L. REV. 1, 57-67 (1983) (hypothetical involving silent and
nonsilent trusts in another administrative context).
47. I imagine that in the future a modest number of trusts will specifically allow
divestment or other forms of social investment, and that a moderate number of
trusts will in the future forbid divestment and perhaps other forms of social in-
vesting. ERISA will limit the statements in the preceding sentence. See
Langbein, supra note 1, at 21.
48. See generally Langbein, supra note 1. But see T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra
note 3, at 49-50.
49. See generally Langbein, supra note 1.
50. See 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5 (3d ed. 1967); Dobris, supra note 46, at 2.
51. See 1 A. ScoT, supra note 50, at §§ 2.6 to 2.7.
52. See id at § 2.5; Dobris, supra note 46, at 2.
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170 & 206 (1959).
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ordinary understanding of an ordinary rule of fiduciary conduct can
easily be understood as forbiding any investment activities that would
primarily benefit someone other than the beneficiary.5 4
If a fiduciary is a trustee then she is held to the highest standard of
trust investment-the prudent person rule.5 5 In a sentence, that rule
provides that "[t]he trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in ad-
ministering the trust to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordi-
nary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property; and if
the trustee has or procures his appointment as trustee by representing
that he has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is
under a duty to exercise such skill."56
1. Pension Trusts
The typical pension trustee is a trustee in the classic sense and
must, in the usual circumstances, invest as a prudent person.5 7 The
pension trustee is being asked to divest because pension funds are so
financially important in today's society.58 Public pension trustees are
being asked to divest because they are subject to public scrutiny and
political pressure,5 9 and because they are not subject to the stricter
ERISA prudent person rule.60 Private pension trustees, generally,
have been subject to less organized pressure to divest because their
actions are confined by the stricter ERISA standard.61
A crucial distinction exists between those trusts that are governed
by ERISA and those that are not.62 Briefly, ERISA, the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,63 was designed to improve
the pension status of many American workers. 64 ERISA contains a
codified prudent person rule.65 Much has been written about the dif-
54. It has been said that "[c]onsistent with this fundamental standard, divestment
may-and must-be justified on either of two grounds: that it will not impair the
financial performance of the organization's investment portfolio, or that it con-
tributes sufficiently to the accomplishment of the organization's purposes to jus-
tify its cost." T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at i.
55. See 1 A. ScoTT, supra note 50, at § 174.
56. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, at § 174.
57. See generally Hutchinson & Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pen-
sion Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1340 (1980) (analysis
of the investment duties of a pension trustee, delivered in a social responsibility
context).
58. See H. GRAY, supra note 28, at 20-25; Schotland, supra note 35, at 31.
59. See H. GRAY, supra note 28, at 29-47; Langbein, supra note 1, at 9; 1 U. CAL. REP.,
supra note 30, at 2.
60. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 7.
61. See T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 42-44.
62. See Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 57, at 1346-52; Langbein, supra note 1, at 6.
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1381 (1982).
64. See Lanoff, The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be
Done Lawfully Under ERISA?, 31 LAB. L.J. 387, 388-89 (1980).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1982). See generally Note, Fiduciary Standards and
[Vol. 65:209
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ference between the common law prudent person rule and the ERISA
version.6 6 For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that the statutory
version of the rule is the same or somewhat stricter than the common
law rule.67 Let us assume that the codified rule is actually more de-
manding, either because of its meaning, or because concern about the
existence and/or the enforcement of a federal rule will lead to more
fastidious trustee conduct.6s
One can imagine ERISA trusts that either allow or forbid divest-
ment. If an ERISA trust were to allow divestment, it would only be
effective if there were sufficient play in the ERISA prudent person
standard.69 ERISA pension trusts are, however, much less subject to
change than other trusts because the prudent person rule cannot be
set aside as to them.7 0 For all practical purposes then, the question of
whether the ERISA prudent person rule allows divestment is one of
great moment.71
Since public employee pensions are outside ERISA, the question
there is whether the relevant investment rule allows divestment.72
The relevant rule is often the common law prudent person rule,73
although statutory standards may have been enacted regulating the
investments of such pension trustees. 74 At one time, most states re-
quired trustees to invest only in specified securities from a so-called
legal list.75 Since the Depression, legal lists have largely been re-
pealed, leaving the more flexible common law standard of prudence to
guide fiduciary conduct.76 Recently, however, a new form of legal list
has emerged that bans the investment of public pension funds in se-
the Prudent Man Rule Under the Employment [sic] Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REV. 960 (1975) (discussing the prudent person rule of
ERISA). There may well be various standards of prudence in the various states.
See Fleming, Prudent Investments: The Varying Standards of Prudence, 12 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 243 (1977).
66. See Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 57, at 1346-52; T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra
note 3, at 44-45.
67. See Ravikoff & Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and the Pru-
dent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 529-30 (1980).
68. See Siegel & Parker, The Rising Tide of Suits Over the Responsibilities and Lia-
bilities of Plan Administrators and Fiduciaries, 1981 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 12-1 &
12-8 to 12-16; T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 45.
69. See Lanoff, supra note 64, at 390.
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1982); Langbein, supra note 1, at 21.
71. See generally Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 67 (favoring social investing).
72. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 7.
73. See Langbein & Posner, The Revolution in Trust Investment Law, 62 A.B.A. J.
887, 890 (1976).
74. See Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 67, at 536.
75. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 50, at § 227.13.
76. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 103 (1973).
State legislatures have recently begun to expand the common law rule to accom-
modate some aspects of Modern Portfolio Theory.
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curities of corporations that do business in South Africa and Northern
Ireland.7 7
Fiduciary conduct must also meet the requirements of the trust in-
strument.7 8 Within public policy and statutory limits, a non-ERISA
pension trust may be amended or initially drafted to allow or forbid a
particular investment policy.79 That is, the prudent person rule is not
obligatory,0 and can be set aside in the instrument.8 1 Thus public
pension trustees have been required by some local governments to
divest.82
2. Charities
Charities, for the most part, are organized as nonprofit corpora-
tions.8 3 Some are trusts.8 4 Charities are targeted for divestment for
several reasons, including the discordance between the South African
investment policies of some multinationals and the eleemosynary
goals of some charities.85
If the conduct of a director of a profit-making enterprise is being
questioned, then the so-called business judgment rule applies.86 That
rule provides that "[a] director or officer has a duty to his corporation
to perform his functions in good faith in a manner that he reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the
care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected
to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances."8 7
The investment conduct of directors of business corporations is
77. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 23(1)(d)(iii) (West Supp. 1985); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 72-1270 to 72-1276 (Cum. Supp. 1984). Some public pension funds
operate under old fashioned legal lists. See S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LiTWAR &
J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 106.
78. See 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 50, at § 227.14.
79. See id. at § 227.14.
80. See ic at § 174.
81. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, at § 227(b) comment p & § 227(c) comments q, r
& s. The prudent person rule cannot be set aside when ERISA pension trusts are
involved, or in the case of charitable trusts if the Internal Revenue Code practi-
cally speaking prohibits it, or the state attorney general, acting on behalf of all
charitable beneficiaries, successfully opposes it. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 21;
T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at i.
82. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 23 (1)(d)(iii) (West Supp. 1985).
83. See T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at i.
84. See M. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 82-111 (1965); 4 A.
ScoTT, supra note 50, at § 348.3. A charity could also be an unincorporated associ-
ation or even facially a business corporation in a state without a nonprofit corpo-
rations statue.
85. See D. HAUCK, M. VOORHES & G. GOLDBERG, supra note 20, at 74, 80; T. Troyer &
R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 15-19.
86. See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979).
87. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 4.01(a) (Tent. Draft No. 4, Apr. 12, 1985).
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outside the scope of this Article.88 The directors of some nonprofit
organizations may, however, be subject to this business judgment
rule.8 9 In other jurisdictions, directors of charitable organizations are
subject to what I would call the charitable business judgment rule.9 0
This rule is somewhat more demanding than the business judgment
rule, but less demanding than the prudent person rule. And, in some
jurisdictions, the directors of charitable corporations are understood to
be subject to the prudent person rule, as if they were trustees. 91
3. Universities
The university trustee is being asked to divest for a number of rea-
sons.92 First, students and faculty are typically the kind of people who
demand action. Second, the university trustee is subject to scrutiny
and pressure. Third, persons involved with colleges and universities
tend to take a proprietary attitude towards them. Fourth, the public
university trustee is exempt from the strict ERISA prudence standard
and, at the same time, subject to substantial political pressure.93 Fi-
nally, perhaps the university trustee is being asked to divest because
our society has a higher expectation of the university and its trustees.
As was once said, in another context, "[ilt is the University's bounden
duty... to inspire, to cultivate, to edify."94
Oversimplifying, the university trustee likely oversees the manage-
ment of one or more distinct funds. Let us assume she is responsible
for three distinct funds: employee pension funds, endowments, and
operating funds.95 The standard of fiduciary conduct for a university
trustee may depend on the particular fund involved.96
The operating funds of the school are typically not held with a goal
of preserving the corpus, but are, i.stead, likely to be exhausted
within a short period of time-let us say by the end of a fiscal year.
The money is likely put into short-term, liquid investments, relatively
88. The Internal Revenue Code aspects of these questions are also outside the scope
of this Article. For such a discussion see T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at
35-40.
89. See J. SIMON, C. PoWERs & J. GUNNERMANN, supra note 7, at 11; T. Troyer & R.
Boisture, supra note 3, at 4-5.
90. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconnesses & Missiona-
ries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1012-15 (D.D.C. 1974).
91. See W. CARY & C. BRIGHT, THE LAW AND THE LORE OF ENDOWMENT FUNDS: RE-
PORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION 60 (1969); M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 84, at
144-46.
92. See D. HAUCK, M. VOORHEs & G. GOLDBERG, supra note 20, at 65-74, 80; 1 U. CAL.
REP., supra note 30, at 2-5.
93. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 7.
94. U. of Cal. (Berkeley), Campus Historical Resources Study 1 (1978).
95. See 1 U. CAL. REP., supra note 30, at 101.
96. See FORD FOUND., ADviSORY COMM. ON ENDOWMENT MANAGEMENT, MANAGING
EDUCATIONAL ENDOWMENTS 11 (2d ed. 1972).
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free of South Africa taint.97 The decisions of the university trustee 98
regarding the investment and disbursement of these funds are similar
to those of a director of a business corporation.99 Fiduciary duties ap-
ply during the period the operating funds are held, but they will be
different than those applied to other funds, no matter what the stan-
dard of duty is. Those fiduciary duties, depending on the jurisdiction,
may be set forth in the business judgment rule, the charitable business
judgment rule, or the prudent person rule.lOO
Endowment funds are typically made up of gifts from private do-
nors. This money is to be held long-term, and perhaps even preserved,
with the income and/or the principal being transferred to the operat-
ing fund or being spent for certain specific educational projects.101
The endowment is, then, similar in some ways to a charitable trust and
in some ways to the capital of a business corporation.102 Thus, the
university fiduciary who manages an endowment fund may be seen as
a trustee who must follow the prudent person rule,103 or as the direc-
tor of a charitable corporation, who must follow either the charitable
business judgment rule,104 or the business judgment rule,105 depend-
ing on the jurisdiction.106
Employee pension funds are often the largest component of uni-
versity funds, especially in public universities. 107 If the university is a
private institution, the pension funds are protected by the relatively
strict prudent person standard of ERISA.108 If the university is oper-
ated by a government, the fiduciary management of the pension funds
is most likely governed by the common law prudent person rule, per-
haps as amended by state statute.109 As explained above,1 10 this rule
can be altered by statute or by amendment of the trust instrument.11
97. See 1 U. CAL. REP., supra note 30, at 101. Anti-apartheid trustees would want to
steer clear of short-term investments offered by businesses with South African
contacts.
98. The decisions regarding the investment and disbursement of operating funds are
really going to be made by staff, not trustees.
99. See id. at 118 n.3.
100. Cf Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconnesses & Mission-
aries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974) (discussion in a charitable corporation
context).
101. See FORD FOUND., supra note 96, at 11.
102. W. CARY & C. BRIGHT, supra note 91, at 26-27.
103. See 1 U. CAL. REP., supra note 30, at 116.
104. Cf. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconnesses & Mission-
aries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).
105. W. CARY & C. BRIGHT, supra note 91, at 60.
106. Id. at 14-15.
107. See S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 1.
108. See T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 42-44.
109. See 1 U. CAL. REP., supra note 30, at 119.
110. See supra notes 67-82 and accompanying text.
111. 3 A. Scorr, supra note 50, at § 227.14.
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With this background in mind, let us then turn to our discussion of
the legal and policy issues involved.
III. ARGUMENTS THAT TRANSCEND THE LAW
A. Moral Considerations in Trust Law
Generally speaking, we have grown used to trust investment law
taking no account of morality in investment.112 It is, however, appro-
priate to consider moral factors when dealing with fiduciary mat-
ters.11 3 It is not written in stone that there is no place for morality in
trust investing. Trusts are creatures of equity and should be subject to
equitable and perhaps moral directives."14
The current anti-apartheid movement is heartfelt and intuitive."35
Many of the arguments against divestment are intellectualized and
cerebral. There are times when the law's response must be heart-
felt.116 A legal system that seems, or is, arrayed against justice is in
danger of disrespect and decay.117 There are times when the law's re-
sponse must be first and foremost moral."s
The legal system, or more specifically the trust investment system,
has enough strength and flexibility to absorb and accomodate a mor-
ally based response to apartheid.3 9 It is appropriate, if not necessary,
to have a trust investment system that incorporates justice. The fear
that fiduciary investment cannot adjust to divestment is reminiscent
of Andrew Mellon's fear that transfer taxation would destroy capital
112. See 1978 Op. Ind. Att'y General 24; 2 U. CAL. REP., supra note 30, at App. H.
113. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 50, at § 227.17 (Supp. 1984); Pedrick, Through the Glass
Darkly: Transfer Taxes Tomorrow, 19 INsT. EST. PLAN. §§ 1900, 1903.2 (1985); Ad
Hoc Comm. on South Africa Investments, Yale University, Report to the Corpo-
ration 5 (Apr. 14, 1978) (unpublished report).
114. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 76, at §§ 1 to 7 (1973).
115. House Hearings, supra note 17, at 373 (1984) (statement of John Ray, District of
Columbia Council Member at Large).
116. See generally F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS (1933) (a book
length treatment of these issues).
117. See ROCKEFELLER FouND., supra note 44, at xix.
118. See generally 0. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959).
119. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 50, § 227.17 (Supp. 1984). And whose morality is it we are
discussing-the fiduciary's? The beneficiaries'? The grantor's? The general soci-
ety's? If there is to be a major overhaul of the trustee's investment duties to
make capital held in trust more socially productive, then I assume the focus is on
the morality of the general society. If the goal is to provide some nonfinancial
benefit to the beneficiaries, and, in pension trusts, to the employer, I assume the
primary focus is on the beneficiaries' morality, and as appropriate the employer's,
if that is possible. In 1977 the University of California adopted a policy to " con-
sider its responsibilities in the context of the social and moral concerns of the
University community." 33 U. Cal. Bull. 135 (1985). See also United States v.
Francioso, 164 F.2d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 1947) (the "legality" of a marriage "does not
finally determine its morality; but it helps to do so"); Schwartz, Ascertaining the
Moral Sense of the Community: A Comment, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 319, 391-92 (1955).
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over time.12 0 Just as the estate tax did not destroy capital, so it can be
argued that divestment will not destroy large trusts.121 Is it not better
to lose a little trust revenue, if that does in fact occur, than to suffer
grotesque injustice? Indeed, it is quite possible that divested portfolios
will heal themselves in our dynamic economy.122 Society can impose
burdens on property in trust for wholesome social purposes.123
There are ways of earning money for trusts that are so improper,
low, and immoral that the question of whether to make or retain the
investment transcends law.12 4 One would not invest in the Third
Reich.125 Once you accept this argument, then the only question is
whether doing business in South Africa constitutes such conduct. This
does not take a great deal of jurisprudential analysis, or great compli-
cation of the relatively mundane question of trust investment.
Law, even technical questions of trust investment, embodies a
moral consensus about how our society is to be run.12 6 If a social con-
sensus is reached about an issue then the law is expected to re-
spond.127 If such consensus is reached that investment in corporations
that operate in South Africa is wrong, then trust investment law can
reflect that consensus. Once the consensus is clear, then we just are
involved in the relatively simple job of conforming the law to the con-
sensus. While the matter is not free from doubt, it is not unreasonable
to argue that there is a consensus on the question of divestment.
There is arguably widespread political support for the essentially
moral proposition that United States capital should not be used to sup-
port apartheid.128 And there is surely consensus on the question of
apartheid.129
B. Moral Considerations in South African Investment
Assuming that morality has a role in the fiduciary's investment de-
cision then the following can be said. Apartheid is immoral. We know
120. Pedrick, supra note 113, at §§ 1900, 1903.1.
121. See S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 95.
122. See House Hearings, supra note 17, at 373 (statement of Stephen K. Moody, Vice
President of United States Trust Co. of Boston).
123. See Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481
(1983).
124. See 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 50, at § 227.17 (Supp. 1984); 1 U. CAL. REP., supra note
50, at 114.
125. See House Hearings, supra note 17, at 219 (Subcomm. markup of H. Con. Res. 216
& H. Res. 372).
126. See J. COHEN, R. ROBSON & A. BATES, PARENTAL AUTHORITY: THE COMMUNITY
AND THE LAW 3 (1958).
127. See F. COHEN, supra note 116, at 22 & 240-41.
128. See L.A. Times, Aug. 2, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
129. See Business Week/Harris Poll on South Africa, Bus. WK., Feb. 11, 1985, at 39.
See also J. COHEN, R. ROBSON & A. BATES, supra note 126, at 5-19 (measuring
community attitudes on parental authority).
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that from many things, including our own national experience. It is
immoral to profit from apartheid, and investments in apartheid should
be sold. The presence of United States firms in South Africa supports
the government of South Africa. 3 0 Those firms pay taxes, invest capi-
tal, and indirectly preserve the status quo.131 To do so is immoral and
should be stopped as soon as possible. Investment in South Africa
does not significantly benefit blacks, nor does it work to improve con-
ditions there.132 It can be said that blacks would be better off free
than they are now, even if freedom requires a revolution or a fall in
their standard of living. 33 Those who oppose this argument seem to
be saying "Better Fed Than Dead." That argument should be rejected,
and on moral grounds trustees should divest and be done with the
place.
The relationship between United States investment in South Af-
rica and apartheid is symbiotic. 3 4 Profits are higher because
apartheid encourages foreign investment. Foreign investment is very
good for the South African economy and this encourages apartheid. 3 5
The circle must be broken.
It is immoral to do nothing. Passivity in the face of injustice is cor-
rosive. 36 Investment has led to increased injustice, and aggressive
shareholding, which is offered as the next best step,137 will likely lead
nowhere.138 The American corporation is not the engine of social jus-
tice in South Africa. 3 9 The corporation is ill-suited for the job. The
number of blacks working for American corporations is small.140 The
advantages of doing business in South Africa are too attractive. The
time has come to divest.
The argument is made that other places around the globe are as
bad or worse than South Africa and therefore that nothing should be
done about South Africa.141 South Africa is arguably the worst coun-
130. See S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 17-18.
131. American businesses may be said to prosper in South Africa because of govern-
ment policies that keep black wages artificially low and the incomes of white
consumers artificially high. See Black Rage, White Fist, Time, Aug. 5, 1985, at 24
& 29.
132. See D. MYERS, supra note 16, at 146.
133. See 1 U. CAL. REP., supra note 30, at 19.
134. See S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 18-19.
135. America and South Africa, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1985, at 17 & 30.
136. Let me make a far fetched argument. The worst sin in the world of trust litiga-
tion is passivity. For instance, it is the passive trustee who gets surcharged. And,
going back 350 years, it is the passive use that gets executed. Can it not be argued
that it is the trustee who sits passively by in the face of injustice who should be
taken to task by the law?
137. See Bok, supra note 10, at 99.
138. See D. HAUCK, M. VOORHES & G. GOLDBERG, supra note 20, at 61-64, 68, 72.
139. See id. at 119-20.
140. See D. MYERS, supra note 16, at 46.
141. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 10.
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try on the globe in which United States firms do substantial busi-
ness. 142 Progress, in any event, must begin somewhere, and there is
no compelling reason to start with a different country. Injustice else-
where is no reason to tolerate injustice in South Africa, or to refuse to
begin with South Africa, or to require a more comprehensive program
of social investing before beginning.
In setting a social agenda there is no obligation to be all inclusive.
If I have a bad knee and a bad back it is absurd to say that since I will
not fix the back, there is no purpose to fixing the knee. Similarly, it
would be absurd to say I must fix them both at once or not at all.
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENTS
A good part of the legal business of the 20th century has involved
the allocation of society's resources 143 and the redefinition of property
rights.144 Interestingly enough, beneficiary interests under trusts
have escaped this ferment. It may well be that the time has come to
subject trust investment rules to a reevaluation insofar as they create
property rights in beneficiaries. It is useful, in seeking to accomplish
that task, to look to analyses that have emerged in other areas of the
law.
A. The Analogy of Real Property Law
We are in a transition period, one might argue, when trust invest-
ment law is metamorphosizing from a body of law focused inwardly on
portfolios and beneficiaries, to a body of law that is focused more out-
wardly on other values as well.145 New values and new notions of
trust portfolio productivity may well be emerging as part of the divest-
ment movement. 14 6 If notions of community and shared values are
included in the trust investment mix, then it is easier to conclude that
divestment is in order.147
To some commentators, social investing may seem stupid or pur-
poseless.148 If, however, one steps back and looks at 20th century
property law, it seems arguable that social investing, or more specifi-
cally divestment, is an idea that comes to us not from outer space, but
out of the evolving law of real property.
142. See Fact Sheet, supra note 37, at 3.
143. See generally Sax, supra note 123.
144. I am certainly open to the argument that this is one of the primary jobs of the law
in any time period. See C. AUERBACH, W. HURST, L. GARRISON & S. MERMIN, THE
LEGAL PROcEss 85-86 (1961).
145. See 3 A. ScoT, supra note 50, at § 227.17.
146. See Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 67, at 519.
147. See Sax, supra note 123, at 492.
148. See generally Langbein, supra note 1.
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1. Changing Public Values
It is expectable, appropriate, and indeed inevitable that changing
public values will be reflected in property law, including trust invest-
ment law.149 The continued recognition of equitable property rights
created under trusts assumes that such recognition produces socially
desirable results.150 It may be that a beneficiary's property interest in
seeing trust assets invested in a social and economic vacuum, in order
to obtain a high return, is not as absolute as it once was. Such has
been the case in real property law.
Once one recognizes the changes that have taken place in real
property law, it is a small step to say that we can, and perhaps even
should, bring the changes over into trust law. As Professor Sax said in
an analogous context: "However shocking such results may be to con-
ventional legal sensibilities, they reveal a trend that is equally obvious
in a range of other areas."151
It is now understood in property law that there is a tension be-
tween efficiency and equity, between productivity and humaneness.152
As the 20th century comes to a close, it is no longer satisfactory to
simply assume that the great resource of capital held in trust, espe-
cially capital in pension trusts, is subject only to the efficiency stan-
dard of being productive but not to the equity standard of humane
use.
153
2. Why We Recognize Trusts
We recognize the trust system for a variety of reasons. Most rele-
vant here, we recognize the separation of legal ownership from equita-
ble ownership,154 and we recognize the passive ownership of shares in
giant corporations by trustees because we assume that this system will
allocate and reallocate property to socially desirable uses. Can we not
say that if the system "fails to allocate property to 'correct' uses, we
begin to lose faith in the system itself? Just as older systems of prop-
erty, like feudal tenures, declined as they became nonfunctional,"155
so it can be argued that the trust system is declining to the extent it is
misallocating property to incorrect uses. If such failures become in-
creasingly common, the property rights and rules that lead to such
failures should be subject to revision.
149. See Sax, supra note 123, at 486.
150. Id. at 487.
151. Id at 488.
152. See P. GOLDsTEIN, REAL PROPERTY Xxi (1984).
153. See B. LONGSTRETH & H. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 28, at 42 (57.4 percent of insti-
tutional investors polled already take social considerations into account in invest-
ment decisions).
154. RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, at § 2 comment f.
155. See Sax, supra note 123, at 484.
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One can imagine a time when general principles of trust invest-
ment law will fail to satisfy society's needs to such an extent that re-
form will occur. 156 Let us remember that trusts descended from
equitable uses, and that when uses stood in the way of the functioning
of English society, the Statute of Uses was enacted to abolish them. 57
The trustee is traditionally obligated to manage the fund in a sensi-
ble fashion, to the best of the trustee's ability, conserving it and mak-
ing it productive.158 This obligation may no longer be adequate.
Currently, the trustee invests as she sees fit, inside a straightjacket (or
at least a girdle) of investment rules, and accepts the consequences of
misconduct.'5 9 Perhaps this method of fiduciary operation, which
takes no account of social responsibility, no longer effectively allocates
and uses that portion of society's capital assigned to the management
of trustees. 160
3. Redefining Property Rights for Social Purposes
In property law realty is subject to use for the public good. It is
narrow-minded and ostrich-like to assume that equitable interests in
intangible property are to be forever free of such constraints. As Pro-
fessor Sax put it in discussing the rights of an owner of real property,
"we are in the midst of a major transformation in which property
rights are being fundamentally redefined to the disadvantage of prop-
erty owners."161 It is not at all clear that the equitable property inter-
ests of trust beneficiaries will continue to escape this transformation.
Indeed, it may well be that the transformation has begun; if it has not,
then divestment may mark the beginning.162
The law has no problem requiring that real property be used so as
to not injure persons. That is one understanding of the law of nui-
sance. 163 One can foresee a rule requiring that capital in trust be in-
vested so as to not injure persons.164
Peeling off another layer of the real property "onion," it may soon
be that trust beneficiaries will be expected to confer benefits on their
156. See Landau, Do Institutional Investors Have a Social Responsibility?, INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTOR, July, 1970, at 83.
157. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 76, at §§ 2-5. The inadvertent result of the
Statute of Uses was the modern trust, which is itself now, arguably, getting in the
way of the functioning of our society.
158. 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 50, at §§ 176 & 181.
159. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, at §§ 197-99 & 227.
160. See Malkiel & Quandt, Moral Issues in Investment Policy, 49 HARV. Bus. REV.,
Mar. - Apr. 1971, at 37 & 40.
161. See generally Sax, supra note 123.
162. See B. LONGSTRETH & H. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 28, at 42.
163. See Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1299 (1977).
164. See J. SIMON, C. POWERS & J. GUNNERMANN, supra note 7, at 18-21.
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neighbors, and sometimes on their communities, just as real property
owners are now expected to do.165 Perhaps having trustees of giant
trusts (essentially responsible to no one, and distant from manage-
ment) passively holding stocks in giant corporations managed by per-
sons (who have no stake in the business and who are responsible to no
one) is more than our system of property allocation can accept.1 6 6
When the use of capital in trust becomes noxious, then the law
surely has the power to regulate that use.167 We are not required to
win the battle of trust investment but lose the war to achieve a just
and wholesome society.168 Simply put, society can require the use of
its resources, including capital held in trust, for its own benefit.169
Trusts, the corporations they invest in, indeed private property itself,
are allowed to exist in society because they serve a wholesome social
purpose.170 It really is not that dramatic to say that trust funds must,
or may be, invested for a broader social purpose than the financial
well-being of the beneficiaries.
We must also remember that we have a history of making trust law
conform to notions of what is good for the greater society.17' For
proof, one need look no further than the Rule against Perpetuities,72
or the general rule forbidding direct restraints on the alienation of
equitable future interests. 73 This holds true in the area of trust ad-
ministration as well. Thus, in Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown,174 the
court set aside administrative provisions of a trust that were interfer-
ing with the rational development of the downtown area of a Connect-
icut city.
It is appropriate for society to expect that a portion of capital will
be devoted, in part, to nonprofit producing uses.175 If a trust were in-
vested in real estate we would accept automatically that the real estate
was subject to a regime of property law that required reduced profits,
and the direct or indirect dedication of some of the value of the land to
the public. 76 Indeed, if the United States corporations in South Af-
rica are required by our society to act in a certain fashion as to South
Africa, no one will seriously complain about abuse of power. What is
wrong if shareholders who are fiduciaries are allowed under trust law
165. See Sax, supra note 123, at 483.
166. See Malkiel & Quandt, supra note 160, at 40.
167. See Sax, supra note 123, at 491.
168. See Malkiel & Quandt, supra note 160, at 39.
169. See 1 A. ScoTT, supra note 50, at § 62.13.
170. Id at § 62. See also B. LONGSTRETH & H. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 28, at 87.
171. See 1 A. Scow, supra note 50, at § 62.9.
172. See i&L at § 62.10.
173. See icL at § 62.12.
174. 105 Conn. 261, 135 A. 555 (1926).
175. See Sax, supra note 123, at 495.
176. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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to act in a way that may reduce profits, but realizes a social good? For
better or worse, if the concern is unfairness to trust beneficiaries there
is ample precedent in modern property law for allocating social costs
to a limited group of property owners. For proof one need look no
further than modern landlord-tenant law or the law of land use.177
It is within the realm of human conjecture that we will someday
conclude that there is no equitable private property right in a trust
beneficiary to prevent the fiduciary, acting on behalf of society, from
making a fair, equitable, or humane use of trust assets. 7 8 What seems
remarkable today may seem commonplace tomorrow. 79 If one grants
that this could be so, then what better occasion to require, or at least
deem acceptable, the use of trust funds to free the blacks of South
Africa?S0
4. Property Rights, Especially Pension Rights, As A Function of
the Political Process
Just as land use is a political process, it is well within the realm of
possibility that the use of capital resources in trust will be, or is in the
process of becoming, a political process.18 ' It may be that the divest-
ment movement we are looking at is not to be characterized as some
kind of dreary politicization of a neutral process. Rather, it may be
part of the continuing evolution and refinement of our property sys-
tem. Thus these events are more inevitable than unfortunate. Pen-
sion funds, then, are not mere targets of opportunity, but are major
parts of our property system that are undergoing necessary reform.
Moreover, it is entirely believable that trust law has fallen behind and
that a "political" expression of the need to modernize is in order.
The diction of the preceding few paragraphs suggests the future.
But, arguably the time is now. We cannot allow for the usual evolu-
tionary period between the time the needs of society change and the
time the law changes. The problems of South Africa's nonwhite popu-
lation are too pressing.
B. Pension Trusts As Quasi-Public Entities
In addition to real property, other forms of private property have
been harnessed for social purposes. 8 2 For an example one need look
no further than our attitude towards the large publicly held corpora-
177. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.1
(1984).
178. See B. LONGSTRETH & H. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 28, at 40-70.
179. See Sax, supra note 123, at 488.
180. See id. at 482.
181. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 9-12.
182. See J. SIMON, C. POWERS & J. GUNNERMANN, supra note 7, at 27.
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tion and a passage from a speech by Harold M. Williams, then the
chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission:
The fact of the breadth of the corporation's constituency is almost universally
recognized today, but the consequences are seldom perceived. What I believe
this expanded constituency necessarily means is that the large corporation has
ceased to be private property-even though theoretically still owned by its
shareholders-and has become, in essence, a quasi-public institution. As a so-
ciety, we depend on private enterprise to serve as the instrument through
which to accomplish a wide variety of goals-full employment, equal economic
opportunity, environmental protection, energy independence, and others.
When viewed in light of these social implications, corporations must be seen
as, to a degree, more than purely private institutions, and corporate profits as
not entirely an end in themselves, but also as one of the resources which cor-
porations require in order to discharge their responsibilities.
1 8 3
Cannot the same be said of pension trusts? Has not the time come
to set aside the rule that trust investment takes place inside a social
and economic vacuum? Pension trusts are so much creatures of soci-
ety that it is appropriate to harness them for the job of producing so-
cially desirable results.184
Indeed, if the pension beneficiaries have a defined benefit-a
promise of so many dollars a monthL8 5-and if the promise will be
made good by the corporate or government employer, or by the pen-
sion guarantee fund established by ERISA,186 then the imposition on
the trust beneficiary or the incursion on hundreds of years of trust law
is much less than it seems.'8 7 The real nature of the fiduciary obliga-
tion is much less clear at that point, because the real nature of the
pension fund in our society is not clear.188
Pension trusts, especially large ones, are very much quasi-public
entities, tightly woven into the fabric of society. 89 It is hardly dra-
matic to suggest that they should be invested to obtain, in part, a bene-
fit for persons other than the direct trust beneficiaries.90 It is
entirely appropriate to impose quasi-public functions on them.191
Divestment and new emerging social values may be anti-produc-
tive.' 92 Trust investment law is designed to obtain production from
183. Address by Harold M. Williams before the Securities Regulation Institute, San
Diego, Cal. (Jan. 18, 1978), quoted in S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J.
KARPEN, supra note 3, at 4.
184. See S. BALDWIN, J. ToWER, L. LITWmAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 3-9.
185. See H. GRAY, supra note 28, at 15.
186. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 5-6.
187. See id. at 23.
188. One must consider if the fiduciary has an obligation to the entity that ultimately
sponsors the plan and focus on that obligation as much as the obligation to the
beneficiaries. See, e.g., H. GRAY, supra note 28, at 25, 29-35.
189. See id. at 20-25.
190. See S. BALDWIN, J. ToWE, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 144.
191. See H. GRAY, supra note 28, at 29-30.
192. Ad Hoc Comm. on South African Investments, Yale University, Report to the
Corporation 38-44 (Apr. 14, 1978) (unpublished report).
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assets held in trust. 1 9 3 Divestment at a cost to productivity may, how-
ever, be acceptable because we are in pursuit of social gain: the aboli-
tion of apartheid in South Africa. There is value in living in a just
society and knowing that one's trust is invested in a divested portfolio.
This alternative benefit arguably should be part of the investment de-
cision mix.194 Trust law should now allow recognition of social gain
obtained at a financial cost,195 all as part of a modern, socially respon-
sible investment decision.196
The point is simple: it is not written in stone that capital held in
trust will automatically and always have to, by law, be devoted to a
higher and more productive profit producing use. It is entirely ra-
tional and appropriate to bring acceptable criteria, in addition to gain,
into the fiduciary investment decision-making process in an effort to
improve society.19 7
Trustees should be required or allowed to take social impact into
account because society can always require a higher use of its re-
sources. 198 The fact that it has not been done before simply means
that the past may be prologue to the future, not that the past is the
future.
C. The Ability of a Trustee to Sell South African Securities
1. The Attorney's Problem with Divestment
There are two, or perhaps three, legal constraints on divestment:
the prudent person rule;199 the duty of loyalty;200 and, in the case of
193. 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 50, at § 181.
194. See Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Divestment For South Africa: An Investment
in Hope § 27.206 (July 1985) (unpublished report to the 197th General Assembly
of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)).
195. See S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 93-95.
196. Indeed, the best single argument for setting aside the idea that trust investment
takes place inside a social and economic vacuum, with the focus of proper conduct
being the beneficiary's welfare, has nothing to do with South Africa. The argu-
ment goes like this. Trustees invest conservatively. Indeed, they invest too con-
servatively. Money invested conservatively does not contribute sufficiently to
economic growth. See generally Langbein & Posner, supra note 73. It is lazy
money from society's viewpoint. Therefore, the law governing the investment of
trust funds should be changed to either require or clearly allow riskier invest-
ments and thus economic growth. The power of the vast funds held in trust
should be harnessed for the economic good of society. See Dobris, supra note 33,
at 1223 n.76. This is arguably clearer and easier to take than the idea that trusts
should be harnessed for social good. Curiously, this also may knock out some of
the MPT arguments against divestment. MPT practitioners would say divest-
ment is too risky. Yet risk, if compensated, is good for society and perhaps should
be forced on trustee investors to make our economy grow.
197. See 3 A. Scorr, supra note 50, at § 227.17 (Supp. 1984).
198. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1968).
199. 2 A. ScorT, supra note 50, at § 174.
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operating charities, 201 the duty to use funds exclusively for the pur-
pose of the charity.202 It may well be that the law is not clear. If so,
then it is hard for a lawyer to assure a client that it is safe to divest,
and easy for a lawyer to say not to divest. Even if, in the law's current
state of development, divestment is forbidden, the law may still
change. The lawyer for a trustee is in a bind. The lawyer probably
cannot opine that divestment is acceptable. At most, she could say
that she thinks the law will come to allow divestment. The trustee
must take the risk of being wrong. Or, she must wait for a case to
come up, perhaps one where a trustee acted without counsel, or took
the risk of divesting, and got sued. Indeed, one wonders where the
case approving of divestment will come from.203
Let us turn to the specific question of interest: "Can a trustee sell
'South African' securities?" More specifically, let us consider the sale
of stock, the duty of loyalty,204 the duties of the prudent person,205 and
the duty to properly expend charitable funds.206 Since the preceding
200. Generally speaking, the duty of loyalty requires that the fiduciary "administer
the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary." RESTATEMENT, sui'ra note 53,
at § 170. This means the fiduciary may not profit from the investment and must
not "be guided by the interest of any third person." Id. at § 170 comment q. If it
is assumed that the investment that is prudent is now being tested under the
loyalty standard, then it seems the following can be said. The primary focus of
the duty of loyalty, when it comes to investments, is on the trustee who breaches
the duty for personal gain. 2 A. ScoTt, supra note 50, at § 170. As such it is not
particularly relevant. While it simply has to be that the duty could be breached
by the selfless act favoring strangers, the nonwhite people of South Africa, the
basic body of law does not seem to be particularly relevant. This is all the more
the case if. (1) there is understood to be an investment purpose to the divest-
ment, see 3 id- at § 227.12; or (2) arguments of defacto beneficiary approval are
given weight, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, at § 216; or (3) one accepts the
argument that the role of capital in trust in our society is changing. See generally
Sax, supra note 123. Troyer and Boisture state that "ERISA imposes a clear and
uncompromising duty of loyalty. A fiduciary must 'discharge his duties with re-
spect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for
the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries
... . " T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 42 (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1) (1974)).
201. I am using charity as a broad general term.
202. T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 29-34.
203. I feel that it would be a mistake to bring on a declaratory judgment because the
court will not then be faced with a trustee who is going to get hurt if the court
finds liability. This I believe would make it easier to say divestment is a breach of
fiduciary duty. See House Hearings, supra note 7, at 54-61 (reprint of a Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment by the Regents of the Univ. of Mich. against the State
of Mich. concerning a Mich. investment practices law).
204. 2 A. ScoT, supra note 50, at § 170.
205. Id. at § 174.
206. See id. at § 379. Note that the duty to properly expend charitable funds could be
called a duty to be loyal to indefinite charitable beneficiaries if one wanted to,
although this does not seem to be an unavoidable category. See id. at § 364.
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arguments about the humane use of capital in trust probably do not
describe the current law as viewed by conservative lawyers for con-
servative trustees, we had best consider if divestment is prudent and
loyal, and in appropriate circumstances, if it is within a charity's pur-
poses.207 I would think that before divesting a pension trustee, more
than another trustee, would want to be able to conclude that divest-
ment was solely in the interests of participants and beneficiaries, or
required by general notions of investing. If so, then as to pension
funds a congressional change in ERISA, or definitive judicial interpre-
tation of the prudent person rule, which would be deemed to affect the
ERISA standard, would be necessary before divestment could take
place.208
2. No Investment Duty to Maximize Profit
There is clearly no affirmative duty to invest in companies doing
business in South Africa, at least not in those terms. Even if these are
the most profitable corporations in the marketplace there is no invest-
ment duty to maximize profit. A fiduciary is merely obliged to invest
in accordance with the various rules governing the fiduciary inves-
tor,209 chief among them being the prudent person rule.210 The law
does not require a minimum level of investment performance.2 11
There is, however, such a thing as actionable inferior investment per-
formance. It results from breaching the applicable conduct stan-
dard.212 In other words, it is not whether you win or lose, but how you
play the game.
Morality alone cannot justify actionable inferior investment per-
formance. But there is no affirmative duty to invest in highly profita-
ble activities that are unattractive or morally repugnant. A trustee is
under no duty to open a brothel in Nevada, where prostitution is legal,
in order to maximize return to beneficiaries.2 13 It may be, however,
that other trust investment duties, such as the duty to diversify,21 4 will
point the trustee towards investments with South African connec-
tions. Thus, the duty to diversify, or the prudent person's duty to act
with skill,215 may cause the trustee to invest in major companies with
South African connections.
Obviously, there is no currently recognized legal duty to sell mor-
207. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 76, at §§ 57-65.
208. But see Lanoff, supra note 64, at 392.
209. 3 A. Scorr, supra note 50, at §§ 227 to 227.3.
210. Id, at § 174.
211. Id, at § 204.
212. I& at §§ 201-12.
213. 1 U. CAL. REP., supra note 30, at 127.
214. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, at §§ 228 & 230 comment j.
215. See id. at § 174.
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ally offensive investments either. The question quickly becomes
whether the fiduciary is allowed to sell. And, if she is, what is the
legal analysis of the direct costs of the sale-e.g., commissions?
D. Problem: The Costs of Divestment
It seems clear there is no prohibition against costless social invest-
ing.2 16 If a trustee wants to follow a "South Africa free" investment
policy, and can do so without incurring losses or extra transaction
costs, then there is nothing much the law has to say.21 7 There is, how-
ever, no doubt that there can be real investment costs to divest-
ment.218 They include: the transaction costs of sale; the lost value, if
any, caused by mass liquidation of assets; the transaction costs of rein-
vesting; the likely increased costs of monitoring a portfolio of in-
creased, smaller holdings; reduced liquidity caused by holding stocks
of less interest to investors; and the added risks of various kinds occa-
sioned by giving up the shares of many major American companies
and replacing them with the shares of smaller and less prominent
corporations.2 19
So what can be said in response to these arguments, and when can
costs be incurred in pursuit of social good?
1. Minimizing and Accepting Divestment Costs
One might argue with some comfort that South Africa free invest-
ing at low cost should be allowed. There arguably is enough benefit in
such a divestment policy to justify the cost, which is low by hypothe-
sis.2 20 Moreover, there is enough play in the system to justify ac-
cepting modest losses in order to obtain a social gain.221 We willingly
accept losses everyday inevitably incurred in pursuit of monetary gain.
Why not accept some loss in pursuit of social gain? This does not,
however, say very much because there may be high costs in avoiding
broad market portfolios that approximate the market as a whole or
portfolios that contain the giant corporations likely to have South Af-
rican contacts. 222
It can also be said that equity often comes at a price of efficiency.
There are many efficient acts we forgo as members of society, and as
216. See Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 67, at 519. See also Langbein, supra note 1, at
20.
217. T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at i.
218. Universities and charities may also incur losses in the form of foregone gifts. See
Ad Hoc Comm. on South African Investments, supra note 192, at 38-45.
219. See S. BALDWIN, J. ToWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 96-121; T.
Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 11-14 & 28-29.
220. Ad Hoc Comm. on South African Investments, supra note 192, at 4.
221. T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 16.
222. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 14-15.
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trust investors, in order to obtain a just and equitable result.223
As to the transaction costs of the sale and purchase, it has been
suggested that orderly sales over an extended period of time will occa-
sion no additional transaction costs because extensive sales would
have taken place anyway in an actively managed portfolio.224 It has
also been suggested that divestment sales, as sales made for noninvest-
ment reasons, generate a lower spread between bid and ask prices.225
Thus it is said that divestment sales can take place more cheaply than
ordinary institutional sales.226
2. Divestment in Pursuit of Trust Purposes
Next, one might argue that divestment fulfills some purpose of the
trust.227 Costs incurred in pursuit of trust purposes are acceptable.228
Thus one might assert that a church endowment can be divested be-
cause one of the church's purposes is to provide moral and spiritual
guidance, and to divest is to provide such.229
Similarly, universities have a duty to lead, to experiment, and to
teach, and they must be given a reasonable margin in the discharge of
their mission.2 30 One might seek to apply this analysis to university
endowments and unrestricted funds, and conclude that divestment
fulfills the fund's purpose. When one is considering the endowment
fund of a major American university with an international constitu-
ency, it is not at all unreasonable to argue that the duty to educate
extends well beyond the current students on campus.231
One might also stretch to include black South Africans, or all
South Africans, as intended beneficiaries of a charitable or educational
trust,232 and find that divestment provides them with an intended ben-
223. The prudent conservatism of many pension trustees may be inefficient. One sur-
vey reported that 90 percent of the funds underperformed the S & P 500.
Langbein & Posner, supra note 73, at 887.
224. S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 114-16; T. Troyer
& R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 13-14.
225. Bid and ask prices, in this context, are simply the price asked by the seller and
bid by the buyer. In the ordinary institutional sale, the bidder underbids by an
amount designed to insure against the theoretical possibility that the seller is sell-
ing for a good investment reason that the buyer does not know about. This costs
the seller money. Divestment sales are made for nonmarket reasons and so the
spread between bid and ask can be smaller. This cost of the sale is thus lower
than it might seem. See S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra
note 3, at 114.
226. See id. at 115-16.
227. T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 15-19 & 29-33.
228. Id. at i.
229. B. BALDWIN & T. BROWN, supra note 26, at 25-27.
230. Ad Hoc Comm. on South African Investments, supra note 192, at 4.
231. Id. at 4-5. See also T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 18.
232. See 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 50, at § 364.
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efit of the trust.233 Thus, a foundation devoted to the realization of
human potential might divest in order to help nonwhite South Afri-
cans achieve their potential in a society free of apartheid.234
Another argument is that the act of divestment provides other tan-
gible benefits to the trust beneficiaries that can substitute for invest-
ment benefits.2 35 That is, there are nonfinancial returns or "other
benefits" to obtain for trust beneficiaries.236 A homely example of
this idea might be the trust for the widow and children that contains
the family home. It seems absurd to require the trustee to sell the
house to buy stocks to generate income to be used to buy a house. The
failure to make the house productive of income is not a breach
of trust-it is merely obtaining another benefit for the trust
beneficiaries.237
Similarly, it might be argued that under appropriate circumstances
divestment of South African securities might procure other benefits,
the classic example being peace and quiet on a campus bedeviled by
demonstrations.238
Another thing to be said is that there is a fair amount of flex in the
system. All investment expenditures and activity do not translate into
profit. We are always ready to accept costs in operating trusts.239 Are
not the costs of justice as entitled to recognition as other costs, espe-
cially when they are not large? It can be argued that the direct trans-
action costs of divestment sales and purchases are, relative to the size
of the portfolios typically under discussion, fairly small.240 Might it
not be said that 'Equity does not stoop to pick up pins?" Indeed, we
may already be accepting costs that generate "incidental" or "collat-
eral" social benefits.2 41 Expansion of this doctrine would be sensible
and expectable.
3. Implied Consent of Beneficiary
One might argue that the current spate of pro-divestment activity
233. See 1 U. CAL. REP., supra note 30, at 19.
234. T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 16-17.
235. See Lanoff, supra note 64, at 392.
236. See Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 67, at 523.
237. 2 A. ScOTT, supra note 50, at § 181.
238. T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 18. Of course, the hypothetical in the
text assumes a direct economic benefit to the widow, while the university seeking
peace on campus is seeking the benefit of being able to efficiently perform its
nonprofit purpose and only the indirect economic benefit of having to spend less
on crowd control and the like.
239. See S. BALDWIN, J. TowER, L. LmvAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 118-19; 3 A.
Scor, supra note 50, at § 204.
240. See L. LmvAK, J. ESTRELLA & K. MCTIGUE, DIVESTING FROM SOUTH AFRICA: A
PRUDENT APPROACH FOR PENSION FUNDS 13-32 (1981).
241. T. Troyer & R. Boisture, supra note 3, at 48-53.
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is to be read as the functional equivalent of beneficiary permission to
divest. The beneficiaries of a trust can, by agreement with the trustee,
change the investment policy of the trust after it is drafted, even if it is
irrevocable. 242 Arguably, the political manifestations of a sentiment
in favor of divestment can be understood by the courts as the
equivalent of the agreement of all of the beneficiaries to a change in
investment policy to accomplish divestment. 243
While this argument should not be considered as determinative,
given the imprecision of measurement,2 44 and the inevitability of disa-
greement among beneficiaries, it might be worthy of some weight in a
court's decision. This argument has the greatest appeal in special situ-
ations where it might be said with something approaching a straight
face that the vast bulk of the beneficiaries do want divestment. This is
imaginable with funds held by a religious entity, or with university
funds, if the overwhelming majority of members of the university
community support divestment.245
To restate what has been said, one can argue that the nature of the
trust or its beneficiaries, or the conduct of the beneficiaries, can be
read as constituting an implied setting aside of the prudent person
rule as it applies to divestment. Obviously, the same argument can be
made to the extent that divestment is disloyal.246
While the above arguments may not be enough to induce action by
conservative trustees, one can easily imagine them as factors in a court
decision not to punish a trustee for divesting. Furthermore, these ar-
guments in favor of divestment need not open the door to social in-
vesting generally. As we all know, we can cross that bridge when we
come to it. There are certainly arguments that the South African situ-
ation is unique and thus in need of special attention.247
V. THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF DIVESTMENT
A. Introduction
Financially, the basic concerns of trustees are whether divestment
242. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, at §§ 216 & 256.
243. Perhaps it can be said that equitable claims of beneficiaries against pension trusts
are much more proprietary than we have recognized in our law to date and so we
should consider heeding the beneficiaries who want divestment. See H. GRAY,
supra note 28, at 25-27. Thus some professors on my campus are wont to ask "It's
my money, why can't I tell the Regents what to do with it?" Of course, both pro-
divestment and anti-divestment employees want to tell the Regents what to do.
244. In a giant trust how many beneficiaries would be allowed to stop divestment?
245. If settlor consent is required, or persuasive, when a court is asked to change a
trust's investment policy after the fact, then the same argument might perhaps be
made as to the argued political manifestation of the settlor's intent.
246. It is interesting to contemplate what role polling might play in determining bene-
ficiary attitude towards divestment.
247. Ad Hoc Comm. on South African Investments, supra note 192, at 3-4.
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will increase investment risks, 248 reduce diversification, 249 or increase
investment costs.250 Such concerns, if they materialize, could lead to a
breach of fiduciary duty.
Many of the investment-based arguments against divestment, espe-
cially in the case of large portfolios, are based on Modern Portfolio
Theory. Oversimplifying, Modern Portfolio Theory, or MPT, is an
umbrella term used to describe a number of loosely related, academi-
cally derived theories that analyze the investment and performance of
stock portfolios.251
MPT suggests several things, including the importance of: broad
diversification;252 investment in a broad market portfolio;253 close
analysis of the amount and types of risk in a portfolio;254 inclusion of
risky stocks in a balanced portfolio;255 management of risk in a portfo-
lio through diversification; 256 management of the portfolio as a single
entity, not a collection of individual securities; 257 and the efficiency of
the market in valuing securities of closely watched corporations. 2 8
MPT has greatly informed modern investing and is worthy of the clos-
est consideration. At the same time, it must be noted that MPT is not
perfect. It is constantly being refined, and while it is usually accurate
at the center, it loses some of its power and definition at its outer
rings.
It is easy to read the work of MPT theorists and conclude there is
no room for divestment, especially in large portfolios.259 Several stud-
ies, however, suggest that MPT does not require that divestment be
abandoned. 260 Moreover, it would be a serious error to make a deci-
sion of the magnitude of whether to divest or not solely by reference
to a less than perfect body of doctrine, one still not in its final state of
development and still seemingly not accepted as controlling in trust
248. See R. HAGIN, THE Dow JONES-IRWIN GUIDE TO MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY 99-
103 (1979).
249. See S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 93-94.
250. For example, the costs of buying and selling and research costs. See i&L at 114-15.
251. See generally R. HAGIN, supra note 248 (a book-length treatment of the subject).
See also Langbein, supra note 1, at 14-15.
252. See R. HAGIN, supra note 248, at 131-33.
253. See id at 183-86.
254. See id at 179-80.
255. See id at 161-65.
256. See id at 132-33 & 186.
257. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 73, at 889-90.
258. See R. HAGIN, supra note 248, at 89-91.
259. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 15; TRINITY INV. MGMT. CORP., INVESTMENT IMPLI-
CATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA DIVESTITURE: A TRINITY WORKING PAPER 2 (1985).
260. See House Hearings, supra note 17, at 181-83 (statement of Stephen K. Moody,
Vice-President, Investments, and Lawrence Litwak, Investment Officer, U.S.
Trust Co. of Boston); S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note
3, at 93-95; F. Cheru, supra note 4, at 10 (a brief study of the question).
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B. Financial Arguments in Favor of Divestment
There are investment or financial arguments in favor of divest-
ment. First, it can be argued that South Africa free portfolios perform
well. Second, it can be argued that the risks of investing in South Af-
rica may be unreasonably high. Third, it can be argued that only a
poorly managed corporation would do business in South Africa in the
first place. Finally, it is arguable that divestment would not cause ad-
verse financial consequences to either small or large trusts.
The first possibility is that South Africa free portfolios perform
well. Well can be defined in various ways, including well enough, as
well as the market, and better than South Africa tainted portfolios.262
Most of the studies backing up these arguments, however, leave room
to conclude that large portfolios, let us say over $50 million, may fall
down in performance over time if they are South Africa free.263 This
negative conclusion seems to conform with MPT.264
Next, divestment proponents argue that the political risk in South
Africa is such that it is unwise to invest in corporations doing business
in South Africa, or with banks that have loans outstanding in South
Africa.265 This argument may be easier to accept when talking about
banks since their exposure seems greater than that of most corpora-
tions that do a relatively small amount of business in South Africa.266
However, accepting the political risk argument requires one to reject
the MPT doctrine that the market price of closely followed securities
already takes into account the political risk.267 It also requires assum-
ing that those who would divest have greater knowledge about South
Africa's future than stock investors generally. This, of course, may be
correct, but it would offend the MPT theorists who would say that the
261. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 73, at 890-91.
262. See House Hearings, supra note 17, at 181-83, 207, 282 (statement of Stephen K.
Moody, Vice-President, Investments, and Lawrence Litwak, Investment Officer,
U.S. Trust Co. of Boston; statement of Joan L. Bavaria, President, Franklin Re-
search & Development Corp.; reprinted opinion letter of Scudder, Stevens &
Clark, Investment Counsel); B. BALDWIN & T. BROWN, supra note 26, at 35; S.
BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 93-95; F. Cheru,
supra note 4, at i (a brief study of the question).
263. See TRINITY INV. MGMT. CORP., supra note 259, at 2; Langbein, supra note 1, at 21-
22.
264. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 15. But see S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L. LITWAK & J.
KARPEN, supra note 3, at 93-95.
265. See B. BALDWIN & T. BROWN, supra note 26, at 31-32; S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L.
LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 21-22.
266. See Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1985, at 22, col. 4; Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 1985 at 1, 18, col. 4.
For data on U.S. bank exposure in South Africa, see A. NEWMAN & C. BOWERS,
supra note 25, at 163-65.
267. See R. HAGIN, supra note 248, at 90-91; Langbein, supra note 1, at 15-16.
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market is "perfect" or nearly perfect in valuing securities. 268
In addition, it can be asserted that corporate management that
chooses to stay in South Africa is either so foolish or so wicked that it
is going to get the company in trouble somewhere; therefore the stock
should be sold before disaster strikes.269 The argument is that the
company's position on doing business in South Africa is a good touch-
stone for answering the general question of whether the company is
well managed. Again, some MPT theorists would argue that this is
already reflected in the price of the stock because of the market's ca-
pacity to accurately value securities.270
There seems to be something approaching general agreement that
portfolios under $50 million dollars can be divested without meaning-
ful effect.271 It is the larger portfolios that create problems. Why?
Well, to use a homely explanation, it is a lot harder to drive a super-
tanker than it is to drive a speed boat.
One of the more attractive and sensible investment policies a large
investment fund can follow is to invest in a passive, low transaction
cost portfolio that seeks to emulate the movements of the stock mar-
ket as a whole. 272 This is usually done by investing in a portfolio that
is made up of the Standard and Poor's 500.273 Such a portfolio is likely
to outperform about 80% of the professionally managed portfolios in
the country.2 74
It has been suggested "that it is possible to construct passive port-
folios that exclude South Africa related securities and that track the
S&P 500 reasonably well . . ." but at a higher nonmarket risk.275
Nonmarket risk is, simplifying, risk that is "uncompensated"; i.e., not
likely to lead to reward. 276 So, the passive investor might survive rea-
sonably well. 277 The report further suggests that investments made
on the basis of mechanical rules may be accomplished sensibly in a
268. It may be that the market is less efficient in measuring foreign political risk than
it is in measuring other risks. As to risk generally, see R. HAGIN, supra note 248,
at 95-103 & 179-89.
269. See B. BALDWIN & T. BROWN, supra note 26, at 30.
270. See R. HAGIN, supra note 248, at 91.
271. See D. HAUCK, THE IMPACT OF SOUTH AFRICA-RELATED DIVESTMENT ON EQUITY
PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE 3-4 (1985); Wagner, Emkin & Dixon, supra note 4, at
14.
272. See R. HAGIN, supra note 248, at 132-33 & 225; Langbein, supra note 1, at 14-15.
273. See R. HAGIN, supra note 248, at 140.
274. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 73, at 887.
275. See D. HAUCK, supra note 271, at 3.
276. See R. HAGIN, supra note 248, at 183-84.
277. See D. HAUCK, supra note 271, at 3. And, it makes sense to be a passive investor
with a large portfolio. The report, moreover, holds out the hope that mathemati-
cal modeling of portfolios may allow for sensible investing, even given the possi-
bility of higher nonmarket risk.
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South Africa free investment world.278 It also suggests that the most
vulnerable investor is the active manager who trades a great deal on
the basis of company specific research.279 The point is, without
overlong involvement with the world of investment, that there may be
rational and appropriate investment approaches to South Africa free
investing of large portfolios.
It may be that the investment of large trust portfolios could do
with a good shakeup. There is a real sameness to how trustees invest,
and it could be that divestment is a needed breath of fresh air in port-
folio management. The great truth is that most trustees do a lousy job
of investing trust funds.280 We tolerate that poor performance all the
time. We accept it because the trustees are trying to do a good job,281
and because we realize two things that are never discussed in the
cases: there aren't enough good trustees to go around,282 and, rela-
tively speaking, 50 percent of the trustee investors are going to be in
the bottom 50 percent of the class.283 Since we accept lack-luster in-
vestment performance in the name of profit, why not accept lack-
luster investment performance in the name of justice? And while we
are at it, why not admit that a lot of our attempts to invest for the sake
of social gain are not going to work, just as a lot of our attempts to
invest for profit do not work?
Whether investment in South Africa free securities is possible at
the same level of quality and risk is something as to which the experts
are in disagreement.28 4 The better side of the argument may well be-
long to the anti-divestment side. Still, there is hope of successful in-
vesting in a South Africa free portfolio, and that hope is sufficient to
sustain further thought and, arguably, action as well.285
278. See id. at 3.
279. See id.
280. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 73, at 887 (90 percent of pension fund manag-
ers failed to perform as well as the S & P 500 for the five year period ended Dec.
31, 1974).
281. The law says this is irrelevant, but I tend not to believe it.
282. TRINITY INV. MGMT. CORP., supra note 259, at 3.
283. See R. HAGIN, supra note 248, at 225. Of course, the bottom 50 percent could still
have adequate performance.
284. See B. BALDWIN & T. BROWN, supra note 26, at 35; S. BALDWIN, J. TOWER, L.
LITWAK & J. KARPEN, supra note 3, at 93-95; F. Cheru, supra note 4, at i. But see
TRINITY INV. MGMT. CORP., supra note 259, at 2; Langbein, supra note 1, at 21-22.
285. I have presented the arguments that suggest that divestment will yield only a
modest loss, if any. I must say, however, (perhaps because it is my pension we are
talking about) that I am very concerned for the stability and growth of a giant
fund invested in a South Africa free portfolio that is managed by reference to
company-specific research. It would be appropriate for a consortium of universi-
ties to sponsor research on this question.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Divestment is a question of great moral, legal, and economic im-
port. It is complicated by politics, the anchor of trust law, and the
burdens of running large pension trusts and institutions. The current
discussion of divestment is uncertain because the effect of divestment
on South Africa and on portfolios is uncertain. All concerned seek to
act morally and, hopefully, within the bounds of law.
Perhaps the time has come to declare that the minimum duty of
the trustee, at least the institutional trustee dealing with a large insti-
tutional fund, should be understood as including a duty to take the
social impact of investments into account, at least to the extent of di-
vestment of South African securities. If that is too strong, perhaps
such trustees should be allowed to take South African matters into
account if they wish to do so.
Much that is said about divestment is speculative. Surely, we do
not wish to have our law stand as an obstacle to justice. We expect
that our law will respond to changing social attitudes, especially when
those changes are bottomed on ideas of morality and fairness. This is
so even in the face of complexity and possible financial diminution.
Hopefully, in the near future, we can derive and put into place a body
of law and financial theory designed to reach the goal of political, so-
cial, racial, and economic justice for all South Africa. Any lawyer can
say "no." It takes a good lawyer to say "yes."28 6
286. I would like to briefly describe, without analysis, some ideas that trustees might
wish to consider in appropriate circumstances. Some of them may raise signifi-
cant legal issues and involve significant expense. I can imagine several possibili-
ties, in the abstract, including- establishing an experimental South Africa free
equity portfolio to get some "hands on" experience; commissioning, perhaps with
other institutions, the definitive study of large, South Africa free portfolios; es-
tablishing a South Africa free fund that beneficiaries could elect for defined con-
tribution plans; and establishing the same for salary reduction plans. I can even
imagine trustees, in essence, going out of the pension business and letting each
employee manage his or her own account.
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